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In Canada, the use of force by police must occur only within the parameters 
of federal laws, provincial regulations, and organizational policies. There is no 
obligation on the part of the police to use force in every situation, for which it 
would be legally justifiable to do so (Sec. 25, CCC). The use of force is dependent 
upon both the unique circumstances of the incident and the particular decision-
making strategies of the individual officer.
Statutory provisions serve to govern the powers, status, and liability of police 
officers within Canada. This legislative framework also provides a means for 
determining when and by whom liability for the tortuous acts of police officers 
will be borne. Liability may flow from the breach of a direct duty of care (primary 
liability) or vicariously from a legally recognized responsibility for the actions of 
another (secondary liability). In either case, negligence will only lie where there is 
a duty, breach of the standard of care, and resulting losses.
Vicarious Liability
In common law, the test for determining whether a police officer is negligent is 
based upon whether there existed a reasonable and foreseeable risk of harm. This 
will vary, however, with the power and duties being exercised by the police officer 
at the time that the alleged act of negligence was committed. The Supreme Court 
of Canada in Priestman v. Colangelo (1959) cited the following statement from the 
English case, Fisher v. Ruislip - Northwood Urban District Council (1944):
The nature of the power must, of course, be examined before it can be said 
that a duty to take care exists, and, if so, how far the duty extends in any given 
circumstances. If the legislature authorizes the construction of works which 
are in their nature likely to be a source of danger and which no precaution can 
render safe, it cannot be said that the undertakers must either refrain from 
constructing the works or be struck with liability for accidents which may 
happen to third persons. So to hold would make nonsense of the statute.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Priestman went on to state . . .
In deciding whether in any particular case a police officer had used more 
force than is reasonably necessary to prevent an escape by flight within the 
meaning of §§(4) of §25 of the Code, general statements as to the duty to take 
care to avoid injury to others made in negligence cases . . . cannot be accepted 
as applicable without reservation unless full weight is given to the fact that 
the act complained of is one done under statutory powers and in pursuance 
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of a statutory duty. The causes of action asserted in these cases were of a 
different nature.
The performance of the duty imposed upon police officers to arrest offenders 
who have committed a crime and are fleeing to avoid arrest may, at times and of 
necessity, involve risk of injury to other members of the community. Such risk, in 
the absence of a negligent or unreasonable exercise of such duty, is imposed by the 
statute and any resulting damage is, in my opinion, damnum sine injuria (Priestman 
v. Colangelo, 1959).
In Priestman, the Supreme Court of Canada notes that general statements regarding 
negligence may not necessarily apply in instances involving authorized use of 
force. In McIndoe v. Pasmen (1991), the B.C. Supreme Court concluded that there 
was a reasonable and foreseeable risk that an officer running with his finger on the 
trigger of his gun would stumble and cause it to discharge. The Court indicated 
that the reasonableness of the action was dependent on the duty being executed by 
the officer at the relevant time:
Therefore, in my opinion, it was negligent for Kirkpatrick to have his finger on 
the trigger of the potentially dangerous weapon in these circumstances. There 
were no urgent or dangerous conditions evident to him, which indicated a 
risk of possible danger to his safety at that time. Nor was the action necessary 
for the purpose of the execution of his duty, which was to carry out a counter-
attack road block and search for liquor. (McIndoe v. Pasmen, 1991)
The B.C. Supreme Court then went so far as to suggest that the burden shifts to the 
defendant to disprove negligence, on a balance of probabilities, in the situation in 
which the plaintiff is injured by force applied directly to him by the defendant. The 
Court quotes from a Supreme Court of Canada case, Cook v. Lewis (1951):
Where a plaintiff is injured by force applied directly to him by the defendant 
his case is made by proving this fact, and the onus falls upon the defendant 
to prove “that such trespass was utterly without his fault.” In my opinion, 
Stanley v. Powell rightly decides that the defendant in such an action is 
entitled to judgment if he satisfies the onus of establishing the absence of 
both intention and negligence on his part. (Cook v. Lewis, 1951)
In summary, these rulings indicate that vicarious liability will vary with the powers 
and duties being exercised by the police officer at the time the allegedly negligent 
act was committed. The acceptable level of force, therefore, will likely vary with 
each unique situation based upon the noted principles outlined by the courts.
Nonetheless, there are numerous cases in which a party has brought an action 
against the police on the basis that excessive force has been used in the performance 
of duties. Generally, the courts have been resistant to finding liability against the 
police. This is reflected in the following cases, which generally raise Section 25 of 
the Criminal Code as a defence.
In Davidson v. City of Vancouver (1986), the police removed a child from the custody 
of the plaintiff’s sister as per an Ontario Court Order. The plaintiff responded by 
launching a civil action against the police agency, alleging that it was not authorized 
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to do so and had acted excessively. At trial, the Court held that Section 25(2) of the 
Criminal Code applied and provided the police with immunity in these specific 
circumstances (Davidson v. City of Vancouver, 1986).
In Goulet v. R. and Gosselin (1987), a police officer arrived at the residence of the 
plaintiff to investigate a reported theft of automobile. During the investigation, 
the plaintiff and the police officer became involved in an altercation resulting in 
the plaintiff’s arrest. While the arrest was taking place, a scuffle ensued, which 
resulted in the police officer striking the plaintiff in the face. The plaintiff suffered 
personal injury and subsequently sued the officer. At trial, the judge dismissed 
the action ruling that the force used by the officer was reasonable (Goulet v. R. and 
Gosselin, 1987).
In Allarie v. Victoria City (1993), two police officers were dispatched to a house 
where an intoxicated individual was threatening others with a knife. As the police 
attempted to arrest the individual, a struggle ensued with one police officer using 
a baton to strike two quick blows to the suspect’s arm. As the police officer was 
about to strike the suspect a third time, the individual suddenly moved resulting in 
the baton striking the suspect’s head. As a result of the blow, the police were able to 
effect the arrest and subsequently transported the suspect to a nearby hospital for 
treatment. Unfortunately, at the hospital, it was learned that the suspect (plaintiff) 
had suffered brain injury from the police officer’s baton strike and was required 
to undergo surgery.
At trial, the judge dismissed the action, citing that the force used by the police 
officers was reasonable under the circumstances. The trial judge also ruled that 
the police were immune from the action pursuant to Section 25(1) of the Criminal 
Code (Allarie v. Victoria City, 1993).
In Christopaterson v. Saanich (District) (1994), the police were summoned to deal 
with two individuals who were intoxicated, refusing to leave a nearby hotel. When 
the police arrived, the plaintiff and her friend still refused to leave, kicking one of 
the four police officers that had responded to the call. As a result, pepper spray 
was deployed, and the plaintiff was subsequently arrested.
The plaintiff sued the police on the basis that the force used was excessive. At trial, 
the judge dismissed the action, citing that the force used was not excessive and 
therefore justified under Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, thereby exempting the 
police from criminal and civil liability [Christopaterson v. Saanich (District), 1994].
In Nault v. Tromblev (1995), a police officer stopped a vehicle, suspecting that 
the driver’s ability to operate the motor vehicle was impaired. Upon further 
investigation, the driver of the vehicle was subsequently detained and placed in 
the rear of the police vehicle. After being placed in the police vehicle, the suspect 
began to act violently, kicking out the rear window of the vehicle. The suspect 
(plaintiff) then stuck his head and shoulders out of the vehicle. 
In response, the police officer struck the suspect on the nose with a flashlight. 
When the suspect attempted to stick his head and shoulders out a second time, he 
was struck once again by the officer. At trial, the judge dismissed the action, ruling 
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that the police officer’s use of force was not excessive under the circumstances 
(Nault v. Tromblev, 1995).
In Anderson v. Port Moody (City) Police Department (2000), a police officer entered 
the subject’s property in a marked vehicle in order to pursue a suspect. The subject 
blocked the police officer’s exit with his backhoe, as he ordinarily did to prevent 
persons from accessing his property or from leaving at once. The police officer 
advised the subject that if he did not move the backhoe, he would be arrested. 
The subject walked away. The police officer radioed for back-up but did not know 
how long it would take to arrive. He exited his police vehicle and one of several 
aggressive dogs came charging at him at which time he used pepper-spray to stop 
the dog. 
The police officer then received instructions from his superior to arrest the 
subject. The subject resisted and was pepper-sprayed twice in the course of being 
handcuffed. The subject was charged with and convicted of resisting a police 
officer. A public inquiry exonerated the constable. At trial, each side agreed that 
the subject’s behaviour was bizarre and that dogs were a factor in assessing risk. 
The only difference in view was whether the officer should have used an empty 
hands technique or retreated instead of using pepper spray. The officer and the 
City argued that appropriate necessary force was used to effect a lawful arrest. 
At trial the action was dismissed. The court ruled that the police officer was entitled 
to be on the subject’s property in order to investigate a crime. The subject’s conduct 
gave reasonable and probable grounds for an arrest. It was not safe for the officer 
to retreat to a locked car in unknown territory with an actively resisting subject 
who was acting in a bizarre manner, nor was it reasonable for him to attempt an 
empty hands technique first, given the exigencies of the situation. The officer did 
not know how soon back-up officers would arrive. Use of pepper spray was within 
the options in the police force’s policy. His conduct was not negligent or grossly 
negligent. The court stated that even if it was, the subject would have been found 
to be 80% contributory negligent, and his damages would have been limited to 
$2,500. (Anderson v. Port Moody (City) Police Department, 2000).
In the case of Thomson v. Ontario (2001), the plaintiff police officers boxed in a motor 
vehicle; however, the driver manoeuvred his vehicle in an attempt to escape. As 
a result, the officers had to jump out of the way, discharging their firearms at the 
vehicle. The driver was hit by two shots but not seriously injured. At the time of 
the investigation by the Ontario Special Investigations Unit (SIU), the plaintiffs 
declined to give statements. The director of the SIU then laid charges of unlawful 
use of a firearm and aggravated assault. The plaintiffs were discharged. The 
plaintiffs claimed malicious prosecution and breaches of their rights under the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter claims were based on the Crown’s 
failure to disclose certain information during the criminal proceedings.
In court, the motion was allowed in part. The plaintiffs’ claims based on the 
breaches of Charter rights were dismissed, as the plaintiffs could not have obtained 
a better result than dismissal of the charges. The motion for summary judgment 
of the claims for malicious prosecution was also dismissed; however, the synopsis 
relied on by the director of the SIU should have set out why the SIU investigators 
concluded that no one at the scene was in danger (Thomson v. Ontario, 2001).
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While the courts have been generally resistant to finding liability against the police, 
there have been exceptions. Judgments concerning the issue of liability and police 
use of force are additionally reflected in the following cases.
In the case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse (2003), Odhavji was fatally shot by 
police officers. As a result, the Ontario Special Investigations Unit began an 
investigation. The police officers involved in the incident did not comply with 
SIU requests that they remain segregated; that they attend interviews on the same 
day as the shooting; and that they provide shift notes, on-duty clothing, and blood 
samples in a timely manner. Under Section 113(9) of the Ontario Police Services 
Act, members of police forces are under a statutory obligation to cooperate with 
SIU investigations and, under Section 41(1), a chief of police is required to ensure 
that members of the force carry out their duties in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act. The SIU cleared the officers of any wrongdoing. 
Odhavji’s estate and family, however, commenced a variety of actions. The statement 
of claim alleged that the lack of a thorough investigation into the shooting incident 
had caused them to suffer mental distress, anger, depression, and anxiety. They 
claimed that the officer’s failure to cooperate with the SIU gave rise to actions for 
misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the chief of police and to 
actions for negligence against the chief, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service 
Board, and the Province of Ontario. The defendants brought motions under rule 
21.01 (1) (b) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure to strike out the claims on the 
ground that they disclose no reasonable cause of action. The motions judge and 
the Court of Appeal struck out portions of the statement of claim. 
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the appeal should be allowed in part and 
the cross-appeal dismissed. The actions in misfeasance in a public office against the 
police officers and the chief and the action in negligence against the chief should 
be allowed to proceed. The actions in negligence against the Province should be 
struck from the statement of claim (Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003).
In Keeling v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1997), two police officers 
were on patrol when they observed a vehicle stopped at a red light. When the 
officers ran a computer check of the licence plate, they discovered that the vehicle 
was reported as stolen. In an attempt to ensure that the vehicle could not flee 
from its position, the police suddenly manoeuvred their police vehicle in front of 
the stopped vehicle. As this occurred, one of the police officers quickly exited the 
vehicle and approached the driver with his gun drawn. 
During his rapid approach, the officer accidentally discharged his firearm causing 
a bullet to enter into the neck area of the seated driver. The injuries resulted in 
the plaintiff being a quadriplegic for life. In addition, it was later learned that the 
vehicle in fact was not stolen. The owner of the vehicle, a friend of the plaintiff, 
had erroneously reported it as stolen in an attempt to have the vehicle returned 
earlier than the date to which he had agreed.
At trial, the judge ruled that the police officers were jointly liable for the plaintiff’s 
injuries that resulted during their bungled “take-down manoeuvre.” The judge 
added that it was reasonably foreseeable, to both Smitas and Oleskiw, that a 
gun could accidentally discharge during the manoeuvre and injure Keeling, but 
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neither addressed his mind to the risk of accidental discharge. Both police officers, 
therefore, were jointly liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff (Keeling v. 
Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 1997).
In Berntt v. City of Vancouver (1997), a police officer shot a teenager in the head 
with a plastic bullet during a riot that occurred shortly after the 1994 Stanley Cup 
hockey game. The Stanley Cup riot began after a crowd of over 50, 000 individuals 
gathered in downtown Vancouver. The mood of the crowd was upbeat early in 
the evening, but the event quickly turned into a drunken brawl. Windows were 
smashed, and stores were being looted. As a result, riot control officers were 
summoned to quell the unruly crowd. 
The plaintiff, Berntt, was one of the key participants in the riot. Berntt was observed 
throwing objects at the police as well as trying to obstruct an officer who was 
attempting an arrest. As a result, Berntt was shot in the back with a plastic bullet 
fired from an anti-riot weapon known as an Arwen gun. Berntt was treated for his 
injuries at the scene and released. Upon release, Berntt returned to the front of the 
unruly crowd and began to once again taunt the police. 
As Berntt was walking away from the front of the crowd, he was shot once again 
with the Arwen gun. Berntt observed the shot being fired by the police and 
ducked. Unfortunately Berntt’s action caused the plastic projectile to strike the 
head portion of his body. As a result, Berntt suffered serious head injuries and was 
in a coma for more than a month. 
At trial, Berntt stated that he continues to suffer memory and speech difficulties 
as a direct result of the injuries that he sustained on the night of the riot. The trial 
judge ruled that the police officer was justified when he fired the first shot at the 
plaintiff; however, the officer committed assault and battery when he fired the 
second shot as the plaintiff did not now pose a threat. As a result, the police were 
found to be 25% at fault for the injuries that resulted to the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
was found to be 75% at fault, as he returned to the front line of the riot, after being 
shot by the police (Berntt v. City of Vancouver, 1997).
Interestingly, the initial decision rendered in the case of Berntt v. City of Vancouver 
(1997) was appealed to the Supreme Court of B.C. Upon appeal, the initial decision 
against the Vancouver Police Department was reversed with the presiding judge 
noting that the articulation of the police officer is critical in determining the 
evidentiary impact of the decision to use force. 
In the 1997 ruling, the presiding judge largely based his determination of the police 
officer’s decision to use force on the video footage of the riotous scene; however, 
upon appeal, the judge in the 2001 ruling based his determination of the police 
officer’s decision to use force upon what the officer experienced:
. . . the trial judge must proceed to the third and fourth questions. In so 
proceeding, he or she should be a doppelganger to the peace officer whose 
conduct is in issue. 
. . . that the issue is whether a reasonable person standing in the position 
of the constable, who had the same responsibility as the officer to bring the 
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riot to an end, and who was operating on the same database as the officer 
acquired both in previous training and experience and from the dynamics of 
that evening including the need to rescue other officers, the need to use gas 
and other anti-riot devices, and who had previously shot a number of rioters 
without causing serious injury, could reasonably have concluded that it was 
part of his responsibility to shoot the plaintiff with an Arwen gun.
. . . His choice to fire on the plaintiff was neither unnecessary nor lacking in 
reason. It follows that the constable’s actions were justified pursuant to §32. 
This is a complete defence, and accordingly, the plaintiff’s action must be 
dismissed. (Berntt v. The City of Vancouver et al., 2001).
Liability in Regard to Failure to Train
In addition to vicarious liability, police agencies are also vulnerable to liability 
for inadequate training of police officers. For example, an injured third party can, 
in addition to pursing the appropriate level of government for vicarious liability, 
pursue a direct cause of action for inadequate training of the police officer in the 
use of force. It is also interesting to note that the police officer may have a cause of 
action for personal injury and losses attributable to inadequate training in the use 
of force against his or her police agency.
Third Party Action in Relation to Inadequate Police Training
As stated, the government may also be liable for third party injuries that occur 
as a direct result of the police officer’s use of force. The public has a reasonable 
expectation to believe that police officers authorized to use weapons are adequately 
trained for the responsibility. Included within this concept is the government’s 
common law duty of care to the injured party. In the case of Just v. B.C. (1989), the 
Honourable Mr. Justice Cory speaking for the majority ruled as follows:
As a general rule, the traditional tort law duty of care will apply to a 
government agency in the same way that it will apply to an individual. In 
determining whether a duty of care exists, the first question to be resolved 
is whether the parties are in a relationship of sufficient proximity to warrant 
the imposition of such a duty. In the case of a government agency, exemption 
from this imposition of duty may occur as a result of an explicit statutory 
exemption. Alternatively, the exemption may arise as a result of the nature of 
the decision made by the government agency. That is, a government agency 
will be exempt from the imposition of a duty of care in situations, which arise 
from its pure policy decisions. (Just v. B.C., 1989)
In the case of the British Columbia, there is no explicit statutory exemption making 
the government liable in those instances that indicate a failure to train. This would 
be in addition to the issue of vicarious liability, which may be imposed under 
Section 11 of the Police Act.
The Police Officer’s Cause of Action for Inadequate Training
A police officer injured while in the course of performing his or her duties may 
allege that the government agency is negligent for failure to adequately train 
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him or her in the use of force. It is important to emphasize that the government 
agency has a responsibility to ensure that use of force is effectively authorized by 
regulating the qualifications of those individuals who are granted this authority. 
It is also within the public interest to ensure that police officers receive reasonable 
training in the use of force. In fact, a lack of policy, procedures, or training may 
serve to expose both the police officer and the government agency to liability as 
the public stakeholder is placed in an unreasonable risk of accidental harm.
As a result of these factors, it is no longer sufficient to simply document that an 
individual attended a training session. Importantly, police agencies must also be 
able to demonstrate that . . .
• The training was necessary as validated by a task analysis.
• The persons conducting the training were, in fact, qualified to conduct such 
training.
• The training did, in fact, take place and was properly conducted and documented.
• The training was “state-of-the-art” and up-to-date.
• Adequate measures of mastery of the subject matter can be documented.
• Those who did not satisfactorily “learn” in the training session have received 
additional training and now have mastery of the subject matter.
• Close supervision exists to monitor and continually evaluate the trainee’s 
progress. 
Liability and General Duty of Care
In addition to the specific issue of liability regarding police use of force, there may 
also be allegations of negligence concerning other operations of the police agency. 
In this regard, there appears to be a growing trend towards the number of litigated 
matters concerning the conduct of policing in general. This trend is reflected in the 
following cases. 
Failure to Protect the Public
In this case, the plaintiff was an infant who had been shot by his school teacher. 
As a result of the injury, civil action was launched against the police agency as it 
had knowledge that the school teacher had made several previous attempts to 
injure the infant but had not acted. The argument was made that the police were 
negligent as they had not apprehended the school teacher before he could inflict 
injury upon the infant. Secondly, the police were also negligent as they had failed 
to guard the safety of the infant. The case eventually was heard by the Court of 
Appeal, which ruled that there was no duty of care owed by the police on public 
policy considerations in this specific instance (Osman v. Ferguson, 1993). 
During this case, in the early morning hours of August 24, 1986, the plaintiff, who 
lived in a second-floor apartment in the Church and Wellesley area of Toronto, was 
raped at knifepoint by Paul Douglas Callow, who had broken into her apartment 
from a balcony. At the time, the plaintiff was the fifth victim of similar crimes by 
Callow, who would become known as the “balcony rapist.”
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In this action, the plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force for damages 
on the grounds that it had conducted a negligent investigation and failed to warn 
women of the risk of an attack by Callow and the police force had violated her 
rights under §7 and §15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
The evidence at trial established that, before the rape of the plaintiff, Callow had 
committed similar crimes on December 31, 1985; January 10, 1986; and July 25, 
1986. All the crimes took place in apartment residences in the Church and Wellesley 
area of the City of Toronto.
The Ontario Court, General Division, ruled that there should be judgment for the 
plaintiff. The Court stated that the police are statutorily obligated to prevent crime, 
and they owe a duty to protect life and property. The police force failed in its duty 
to protect the plaintiff and the other victims from a serial rapist known to be in 
their midst by failing to warn them so that they might have had the opportunity 
to take steps to protect themselves. A meaningful warning could and should have 
been given to the women who were at particular risk. This warning would not 
have compromised the investigation. 
The professed reason for the police not providing a warning (i.e., that the assailant 
might flee) was not genuine. The real reason was that police officers assigned to the 
case believed that women living in the area would become hysterical and scare off 
the offender, jeopardizing the investigation. In addition, police were not motivated 
by any sense of urgency because the balcony rapist crimes were regarded as not as 
serious as other rapist crimes that were distinguished by more violence.
The police were aware of the risk but deliberately failed to inform her of it. The 
defendants exercised their discretion in the investigation in a discriminatory and 
negligent way, and their exercise of discretion was contrary to the principle of 
fundamental justice. The plaintiff was entitled to an award of damage as a remedy 
under §24 of the Charter. 
Damages should be assessed in the following amounts: general damages, $175,000; 
special damages to date, $37,301.58; and future costs, $8,062.74. The plaintiff was 
also entitled to an amount that equalled the present value of the sum required to 
produce $2,000 annually for 15 years for transportation costs and to a declaration 
that the defendants violated her right under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (Jane Doe v. Board of Commissioners of Police for the Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto et al., 1998).
Duty of Care to Prisoners
Police officers also have an obligation to protect the individuals that they arrest 
or incarcerate while awaiting disposition. In the case of Funk v. Clapp (1988) a 
prisoner had been arrested for impaired driving. As per procedure, the arresting 
officer conducted a physical search of the suspect but failed to locate a belt that the 
individual had hidden on his person. Eventually, the individual was lodged in a 
cell in possession of his hidden belt. While in custody, the individual committed 
suicide by hanging himself. 
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When the incident went to trial, it was determined that the arresting officer had 
not conducted the physical search in accordance with the requirements set out 
in the police agency’s policy. In addition, it was also revealed that the prison 
custodian did not regularly check on the prisoner as was required within policy. 
Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the action finding that while these omissions 
did occur they did not result in a breach of duty to take reasonable care for the 
safety of the prisoner (Funk v. Clapp, 1988).
In the case of Gerstel v. Penticton City (1995), the plaintiff was arrested and placed 
in custody, awaiting trial on criminal charges. The plaintiff had a history of mental 
illness that included being diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia with 
symptoms of depression, illusions, and paranoia. Nonetheless, he was transferred 
to a regular police holding cell with provisions made for frequent observational 
checks. 
Unfortunately, between two of the scheduled checks, the plaintiff became 
delusional and climbed to the top of the cell bars. The plaintiff then dove head 
first onto the concrete floor of the cell block sustaining injuries that rendered him 
a quadriplegic. A subsequent civil action was launched against the police agency, 
alleging negligence in regards to the duty imposed.
At trial, the judge dismissed the action against the agency stating that although 
there is a duty of care to all prisoners in custody, that includes the use of reasonable 
care to protect them from foreseeable risk; in this instance, the police did not depart 
from the standard of care expected of them (Gerstel v. Penticton City, 1995).
Conclusion
In summary, it appears that Canadian courts have generally resisted finding that 
police agencies have breached the expected standard of care owed to members of 
the public. The reason for this may be due in part to the rapid and complex sequence 
of events in which police personnel frequently find themselves. In many of these 
precarious situations, it would be unreasonable to expect flawless decisionmaking 
on the part of the police agency in regards to all of the circumstances at hand. 
While the police have an expected duty of care to protect all individuals, their 
duty is limited to protection from reasonable and foreseeable risk. By virtue of 
their rulings, the courts have indicated that the plaintiff must demonstrate the 
following:
• That the police owed a duty of care to the plaintiff
• That the police should have observed a particular standard of care in order to
perform or fulfill that duty
• That the police breached their duty of care by failing to fulfill or observe their
standard of care
• That such breach of duty caused damage or loss to the plaintiff
• That such damage was not too remote a consequence of the breach so as to
render the police not liable for its occurrence
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Importantly, there is a noticeable lack of judgments against Canadian police 
agencies in both criminal and civil domains. In this regard, John Westwood, 
Director of the Civil Liberties Association of British Columbia writes, . . .
. . . the police in Canada, by and large, see themselves as public servants, as 
crime fighters answerable to the citizenry . . . public prosecutors are not afraid 
to lay charges against the police when the evidence is there . . . the courts are 
willing to find against the police. Of course, it is more difficult to convict a 
police officer than it is an ordinary citizen or to get a civil judgment against 
the police: When we allow the police to use force against us, we must allow 
them some freedom from being second-guessed about their split-second 
judgments. (Westwood, 1997, p. A23) 
Noteworthy is that police officers in Canada and the United States are receiving 
better training and more precise guidance by departmental policy and appear to 
be making better decisions in the field regarding the usage of force than in the 
past. In addition, both Canadian and U.S. police have more equipment options 
at their disposal than in former years, which give them viable ranges of force to 
utilize when encountering resistance. 
In addition to these developments, the concern regarding negligence and liability 
appears to have intensified professionalism within policing. As a result, Canadian 
police agencies appear to have become more proactive in meeting the demands 
and expectations of both the courts and the public. This approach is a departure 
from past practices, which were largely reactive, often taking the form of policy 
changes. 
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